We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. We consider a directed network in which each edge possesses a latency function describing the common latency incurred by all traffic on the edge as a function of the edge congestion. Given a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes in the network, we aspire toward an assignment of traffic to paths in which the sum of all travel times (the total latency) is minimized; however, in many settings network users are free to route their traffic in a selfish manner, without regard to the total latency. We therefore assume that each network user routes its traffic on the minimum-latency path available to it, given the network congestion caused by the other users. In general such a "selfishly motivated" assignment of traffic to paths (a Nash equilibrium) will not minimize the total latency; hence, selfish behavior carries the cost of decreased network performance. We quantify this degradation in network performance via the price of anarchy, defined as the worst possible ratio between the total latency of a Nash equilibrium and of a minimum-latency routing of the traffic.
INTRODUCTION

Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. More precisely, we consider a directed network in which each edge possesses a latency function describing the common latency incurred by all traffic on the edge as a function of the edge congestion. Given a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes in the network, we aspire toward an assignment of traffic to paths minimizing the sum of all travel times (the total latency) of the network users. Unfortunately, in many settings network users are free to route their traffic in a selfish manner, without regard to the total latency.
Before attempting to quantify the cost of selfish behavior, we must describe our model of selfish routing in a network. We assume that an unregulated network user will always choose the minimum-latency path from its source to its destination (given the link congestion caused by the rest of the network users) and hence expect the routes chosen by users to form a Nash equilibrium in the sense of classical game theory [13] . We further assume that each network user controls a negligible fraction of the overall traffic (e.g., each user could represent a car in a highway system or a packet in a high-bandwidth communication network); feasible assignments of traffic to paths in the network can then be modeled as network flow, with the amount of flow between a pair of nodes in the network equal to the rate of traffic between the two nodes. A Nash equilibrium then corresponds to a flow in which all flow paths between a given source and destination have minimum latency (if a flow does not have this property, some traffic can improve its travel time by switching from a longer path to a shorter one).
Traffic flows at Nash equilibrium do not in general minimize the total latency incurred by network users; this is a special case of the more general phenomenon that a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game typically does not optimize social welfare (perhaps the most famous example of this is the "The Prisoner's Dilemma" [4, 15] ). Thus, we can study the cost of routing selfishly via the following question: for an arbitrary multicommodity flow network with congestion-dependent edge latencies, what is the worst-case ratio between the total latency of a flow at Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal flow (i.e., a flow minimizing the total latency) ? Roughgarden and Tardos [20] showed that this ratio (dubbed "the price of anarchy" by Papadimitriou [14] ) can be arbitrarily large unless additional structure is imposed on the classes of allowable edge latency functions and/or allowable network topologies. This observation motivates the central questions of our paper:
(1) Are there non-trivial classes of network topologies for which the price of anarchy is smaller than for arbitrary networks?
(2) Which classes of edge latency functions admit a finite price of anarchy? What is the price of anarchy in these cases?
Our Results
We show that the underlying network topology plays no role in the determination of the price of anarchy. Specifically, we show that under weak hypotheses on the class of allowable latency functions 1 , the worst-case ratio between the total latency of a flow at Nash equilibrium and that of a minimum-latency flow in any multicommodity flow network is achieved by a single-commodity instance on a set of parallel links. Thus, for any fixed class of latency functions, no non-trivial restriction on the class of allowable network topologies (or on the number of commodities) will improve the price of anarchy. In the special case of a class of latency functions that includes all of the constant functions (i.e., functions of the form (x) = c for c > 0), we prove that a network with only two parallel links suffices to achieve the worst-possible ratio. Informally, these results imply that the inefficiency inherent in a flow at Nash equilibrium stems from the inability of selfish users to discern which of two competing routes is superior and not from the topological complexity arising from the diverse intersections of many paths belonging to different commodities.
This result stands in sharp contrast with several previously proven facts. In particular, Roughgarden and Tardos [20] studied a related model in which network users may carry more than a negligible fraction of the overall traffic and showed that the cost of routing selfishly is provably larger in general networks than in networks with parallel links; Roughgarden [17] showed that the equilibria in a Stackelberg game related to the traffic model of this paper are 1 For example, it suffices for the class to satisfy a mild and standard convexity assumption, to be closed under multiplication by positive scalars, and to possess some latency function that is positive when evaluated with zero congestion. Almost all classes of latency functions previously considered in the literature meet the required hypotheses.
provably worse in general graphs than in networks of parallel links; and Roughgarden [16] proved that Braess's Paradox (the counterintuitive phenomenon that removing arcs from a network may decrease the cost of selfish routing) cannot occur in networks of parallel links, and that the paradox becomes more severe as the underlying network becomes more complex.
Our proof techniques give powerful methods for computing the price of anarchy with respect to an arbitrary class of latency functions. In particular, we provide an expression that completely characterizes the price of anarchy for classes that satisfy certain very weak hypotheses and compute this expression for several function classes considered in the literature. For example, we show that the price of anarchy for networks with latency functions that are polynomials with degree at most p is achieved by a two-node, two-link network with latency functions (x) = 1 and (x) = x p ; a calculation then shows that the price of anarchy is precisely
). We also consider latency functions of the form (x) = (u − x) −1 that arise as the delay functions of M/M/1 queues [6] (where u > 0 should be interpreted as the edge capacity or the queue service rate); these latency functions have been extensively studied in the networking community [7, 8, 10, 12] . Here, we have a finite price of anarchy if and only if we constrain the sum of all traffic rates to be at most a constant Rmax and the minimum allowable edge capacity to be a constant umin > Rmax; in this case, the price of anarchy is precisely
These results are the first tight analyses of the price of anarchy for significant classes of latency functions outside the class of linear functions (for which the worst-case ratio was shown to be 4 3 by Roughgarden and Tardos [20] ).
Related Work
The traffic model studied in this paper dates back to the 1950's [1, 22] and has been studied extensively ever since (see [18] for further historical references). However, the problem of quantifying the inefficiency inherent in a userdefined equilibrium has been considered only recently, first by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [9] (in a different model) and subsequently by Roughgarden and Tardos [20] for the traffic model of this paper. The latter paper gave a partial solution to the problem of quantifying the price of anarchy; specifically, Roughgarden and Tardos [20] proved that when every latency function is linear in the edge congestion, the total latency experienced by a flow at Nash equilibrium is at most 4 3 times that experienced by an optimal flow, and that this result is best possible. Roughgarden and Tardos [20] also showed that, assuming only that latency functions are continuous and nondecreasing, the total latency incurred by a flow at Nash equilibrium is at most that of an optimal flow forced to route twice as much traffic between each source-destination pair. More recently, Roughgarden and Tardos [19] extended these results to a broader class of games (that need not take place in a network); Roughgarden [17] examined the inefficiency of Stackelberg (rather than Nash) equilibria when one player is a network manager wishing to optimize network performance; Mavronicolas and Spirakis [11] and Czumaj and Vöcking [2] obtained improved bounds on the price of anarchy in the original model of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (where the price of anarchy is also known as the coordination ratio); and Fried-man [5] showed that in any network, for "most" traffic rate vectors the cost of selfish routing is much smaller than the worst-case value.
Organization
After reviewing some technical preliminaries in Section 2, in Section 3 we give an upper bound on the price of anarchy with respect to an arbitrary class of allowable latency functions. In Section 4 we give matching lower bounds with networks of parallel links, thereby showing that the price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. Section 5 gives a general method for computing the price of anarchy with respect to an arbitrary class of latency functions, and applies this method to classes of latency functions that are well studied in the literature.
PRELIMINARIES
The Model
We consider a directed network G = (V, E) with vertex set V , edge set E, and k source-destination vertex pairs {s1, t1}, . . . , {s k , t k }. We allow parallel edges but have no use for self-loops. We denote the set of (simple) si-ti paths by Pi, and define P = ∪iPi. A flow is a function f : P → R + ; for a fixed flow f we define fe = È P :e∈P fP . We sometimes refer to a source-destination pair {si, ti} and the si-ti paths of Pi as commodity i. When we wish to concentrate on the flow of a particular commodity i, we write f i for the restriction of f to Pi and f i e for È P ∈P i :e∈P fP . We associate a finite and positive rate r i with each pair {si, ti}, the amount of flow with source si and destination ti; a flow f is said to be feasible if for all i,
i . Finally, each edge e ∈ E is given a congestion-dependent latency that we denote by e(·). For each edge e ∈ E, we assume that the latency function e is nonnegative, differentiable, and nondecreasing. The latency of a path P with respect to a flow f is defined as the sum of the latencies of the edges in the path, denoted by P (f ) = È e∈P e(fe). We will call the triple (G, r, ) an instance.
We define the cost C(f ) of a flow f in G as the total latency incurred by f , i.e., C(f ) = È P ∈P P (f )fP . By summing over the edges in a path P and reversing the order of summation, we may also write C(f ) = È e∈E e(fe)fe.
With respect to an instance (G, r, ), a feasible flow minimizing C(f ) is said to be optimal or minimum-latency.
Flows at Nash Equilibrium
Following Roughgarden and Tardos [20] , we formalize our notion of a "selfishly defined traffic flow" in the next definition. Definition 2.1. A flow f in G is at Nash equilibrium (or is a Nash flow) if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, P1, P2 ∈ Pi with fP 1 > 0, and δ ∈ (0, fP 1 ], we have
Letting δ tend to 0, continuity and monotonicity of the edge latency functions give the following useful characterization of a flow at Nash equilibrium. 
Briefly, Lemma 2.2 states that, in a flow at Nash equilibrium, all flow travels on minimum-latency paths. In particular, if f is at Nash equilibrium then all si-ti flow paths (i.e., si-ti paths to which f assigns a positive amount of flow) have equal latency, say L i (f ). Thus, we can express the cost C(f ) of a flow f at Nash equilibrium in a particularly nice form.
The next lemma states that, in a flow at Nash equilibrium, any edge carrying a positive amount of flow must be a minimum-latency path between its endpoints. It is a special case of a result proved by the author in [16] , and follows easily from Lemma 2.2. It is also reassuring to note that flows at Nash equilibrium always exist and are essentially unique.
Lemma 2.5 ([1, 3, 20]). An instance (G, r, ) with continuous, nondecreasing latency functions admits a feasible flow at Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if f, f are flows at Nash equilibrium, then C(f ) = C(f ).
Call a flow f acyclic if, for each commodity i, the subgraph of edges e on which f i e > 0 is (directed) acyclic. Our final result about flows at Nash equilibrium, implicit in [16] , states that we may assume with no loss of generality that our Nash flows are acyclic.
Lemma 2.6 ([16]
). An instance (G, r, ) with continuous, nondecreasing latency functions admits an acyclic feasible flow at Nash equilibrium.
Characterizing Optimal Flows via Marginal Cost Functions
We have given in Lemma 2.2 a convenient characterization of flows at Nash equilibrium. Assuming mild extra conditions on our latency functions, we have the following analogous characterization of optimal flows. 
Then, a flowf feasible for (G, r, ) is optimal if and only if it is at Nash equilibrium for (G, r,ˆ ).
We will typically denote an optimal flow byf . We denote the marginal cost function of an edge,
(x· e(x)), byˆ since it is in some sense an "optimal latency function"; precisely, the optimal flow arises as a flow at Nash equilibrium with respect to latency functionsˆ .
UPPER-BOUNDING THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
The goal of this section is to provide an upper bound on the worst-case ratio between the cost of a Nash flow and of an optimal flow, given a fixed but arbitrary class of allowable latency functions.
2 To better understand the obstructions to this ambition, we recapitulate a family of bad examples from [20] . Fix a positive integer p and define a network with source s, sink t, and two edges directed from s to t. Defining the latency functions by 1(x) = 1 and 2(x) = x p and setting the traffic rate to 1, the flow at Nash equilibrium routes the entire unit of flow on the second link (equalizing the latency of both routes at 1), thereby incurring 1 unit of total latency. The optimal flow routes (p + 1) −1/p units of flow on the second link and the rest on the first, incurring
). Thus, as we allow steeper and steeper latency functions to be used, the worst-case ratio between the cost of a Nash and of an optimal flow grows without bound.
Since this worst-case ratio depends crucially on how "nice" the class of allowable latency functions is, one may ask whether any meaningful upper bound is possible for an arbitrary class of latency functions. The answer is affirmative, provided that the upper bound is a function of the class of allowable latency functions.
To state the main result of this section precisely, denote by ρ(G, r, ) ≥ 1 the ratio between the cost of a Nash and of an optimal flow for instance (G, r, ) (this ratio is well-defined by Lemma 2.5). We will associate a real number α(L) ≥ 1 to each class L of allowable edge latency functions that quantifies the "steepness" of the latency functions in L, and will then prove that for any instance (G, r, ) with latency functions in the class L, ρ(G, r, ) ≤ α(L). In Section 4 we will provide a matching lower bound, by exhibiting (for any class L) instances with latency functions in L and ρ-value arbitrarily close to α(L).
Quantifying "Steepness"
Our first task is to find a definition that captures how "nice" a given class of allowable latency functions is. Before giving our definition (which, admittedly, is not immediately intuitive), we will consider a motivating example. It will be convenient to apply Proposition 2.7 to compute the optimal flow in this example; for this reason and others that will become clear later in this section, we introduce special terminology for classes of latency functions that satisfy the convexity hypothesis of Proposition 2.7.
collection L of latency functions is standard if it contains a non-zero function and if for each
We note that a latency function in a standard class may be any convex function, or log(1 + x), etc.
idea is to mimic the bad examples with polynomial latency functions given at the beginning of this section as best we can, given that L is the class of latency functions that we are allowed to work with. For simplicity, assume that the constant function 1(x) = 1 lies in L. Then, we can consider the usual two-node, two-link network, assign the first link the latency function 1 and the second link the "steepest" latency function that we can find. More formally, suppose 2 ∈ L is assigned to the second link where 2 satisfies 2(0) < 1 and 2(x) > 1 for x sufficiently large. Choosing r > 0 to satisfy 2(r) = 1, we find that a Nash flow with traffic rate r routes all of its flow on the second edge for a total latency of r. Recalling Proposition 2.7 and the marginal cost functionŝ defined therein, and letting λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfyˆ 2(λr) = 1, we find that the optimal flow routes λr units of flow on the second link and (1 − λ)r units of flow on the first link, for a total latency of λr 2(λr) + (1 − λ)r. Letting µ ∈ [0, 1] denote 2(λr), the ratio between the total latency of the Nash flow and of the optimal flow is [λµ + (1 − λ)] −1 . Taking into account that this argument can be used with 1 replaced by any constant function, we arrive at the following definition.
where
That the scalar λ ∈ (0, 1) exists follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem and the fact thatˆ (0) = (0) ≤ (r) ≤ (r). In most cases of interest λ will be uniquely determined by and r; otherwise, the convexity condition ensures that the anarchy value is well-defined (i.e., that [λµ
is independent of the choice of λ satisfyingˆ (λr) = (r)).
The anarchy value of a latency function should be interpreted as the worst possible value of ρ (the ratio between the cost of a Nash flow and of an optimal flow) that can be achieved in a two-node, two-link network where one edge possesses latency function and the other possesses a constant latency function; the worst-case is taken over choices of the constant and over choices for the traffic rate.
Since we are interested only in the "steepest" latency functions of a class, the next definition should be unsurprising.
Remarks:
The anarchy value lies in [1, ∞] and need not be finite. While the anarchy value may seem a fearsome expression to compute analytically, we will see in Section 5 that it can typically be worked out in cases of practical interest.
We have already argued informally that if L is a standard class of latency functions containing the constant functions, then there are instances I on a network with two nodes and two links and latency functions in L with ratio ρ arbitrarily close to the anarchy value α(L). On the other hand, there is no reason a priori to expect the anarchy value to have any connection to instances defined on more general networks (or even to those defined on parallel networks with more than two links). The central technical result of this paper is that, assuming only that the class L of allowable latency functions is standard, the anarchy value α(L) upper bounds the ratio ρ(G, r, ) for any instance (G, r, ) with latency functions in L (with an arbitrary network topology and an arbitrary number of commodities).
Proof Approach
We next discuss our proof approach. At the highest level, the proof of the main theorem of this section is inspired by that of a theorem of Roughgarden and Tardos [20] , which states: in an arbitrary network with linear latency functions (i.e., latency functions of the form (x) = ax + b for a, b ≥ 0), the cost of a Nash flow is at most 4/3 times that of an optimal flow. The proof of this theorem has three steps, as follows. First, the characterizations of Nash and optimal flows (Lemma 2.2 and Proposition 2.7) are used to show that if f is a flow at Nash equilibrium for an instance (G, r, ) with linear latency functions, then the scaled-down flow f/2 is optimal for the instance (G, r/2, ). Second, the cost of f/2 is lower bounded in terms of the cost of f ; this is not difficult since the scaled-down flow f/2 is a "significant fraction" of f . Finally, the cost of augmenting the flow f/2 to a flow optimal for (G, r, ) is lower-bounded in terms of the cost of f . This is the most difficult part of the proof; roughly, the argument leverages the connection between Nash and optimal flows given in Proposition 2.7 to show that the marginal cost of routing new flow with respect to f/2 is high, and thus augmenting the flow f/2 to a flow at the full set of traffic rates r is costly.
A direct attempt at adapting the three-step approach of [20] to more general latency functions fails immediately. In particular, for non-linear latency functions (even for quadratic latency functions), there is no constant c for which a scaled-down version f/c of a Nash flow f is optimal for the reduced traffic rates r/c. Thus, it is not at all clear how to exploit our characterizations of Nash and optimal flows to relate their respective costs. To circumvent this problem, we view the proof approach of [20] in the following more general way: chop up an optimal flow into two "pieces" (in [20] , f/2 and an augmentation from f/2 to a flow feasible for rates r) such that each piece can be lower-bounded in terms of the cost of a Nash flow. Guided by a desire to define the second piece of the optimal flow as an augmentation of the first and to lower bound its cost by means of marginal cost functions (as in [20] ), we will define the first piece in a way that ensures that any augmentation with respect to it has large marginal cost. Unfortunately, this requires scaling down a Nash flow f by different factors on different edges, thereby producing an object which is not a flow (it is a more general object that need not obey conservation constraints, which we call a pseudoflow). While this does not significantly complicate the lower bound for the cost of the scaled-down pseudoflow (it is a "significant fraction" of the Nash flow, as in [20] ), a careful analysis is now required to lower bound the cost of an augmentation from the scaled-down pseudoflow to a flow feasible for the original instance (as we are augmenting with respect to an object more complicated than simply a flow at reduced traffic rates). In contrast to the results of Roughgarden and Tardos [19, 20] , our arguments will exploit the combinatorial structure of the underlying network.
Proof of the Upper Bound
We now turn toward making these ideas precise. We first define what we mean by a "scaled-down pseudoflow". The idea is to scale down the amount of Nash flow on a single edge until the value of the marginal cost function equals the original latency incurred by the Nash flow on that edge (this original latency is then our definition of "large marginal cost"). Formally, if f is a flow at Nash equilibrium, our scaled-down pseudoflow will be defined by {λefe}e∈E where λe satisfiesˆ (λefe) = e(fe) (as in Definition 3.2). As discussed following Definition 3.2, these scaling factors always exist but need not be unique; our analysis must work with an arbitrary choice of scaling factors.
The next lemma formalizes the notion of "breaking up the optimal flow into two pieces". Again, the idea is to express the cost of the optimal flow as one term that is a scaled-down version of a Nash flow, and a second term that corresponds to an augmentation with respect to large marginal costs. with the final equality holding by the definition of λe.
Note that neither the statement nor the proof of Lemma 3.4 assumes that the expressionfe − λefe is nonnegative for all edges e; put differently, the augmentation from the pseudoflow defined by {λefe}e∈E to a flowf optimal for the original instance may increase or decrease the amount of flow on an edge.
We now turn our attention toward lower-bounding the right-hand side of Lemma 3.4. It would be both technically convenient and conceptually simple to lower bound each of the two sums in Lemma 3.4 separately. Unfortunately, this is a luxury that we cannot afford; considering each term separately fails to give a sharp lower bound, and we must lower bound both terms simultaneously.
As a first step in obtaining a good lower bound, we will identify collections of edges on which, in an aggregate sense, the amount of flowfe far exceeds that of the scaled-down pseudoflow, λefe. To accomplish this, we require a new definition.
Suppose (G, r, ) is an instance and f is an acyclic Nash flow (that is, the edges supporting f i form an acyclic graph for each commodity i; see Lemma 2.6). For a commodity i and a vertex v, let d i (v) denote the length of a shortest si-v path with respect to edge lengths e(fe). Let πi denote an ordering (i.e., a permutation) of the vertices of G with the following three properties:
(1) the source si is the first vertex in the ordering Observe that πi exists by Lemma 2.4 and since f i is acyclic; for example, we can obtain πi by topologically sorting the vertices of G with respect to the subgraph of edges e on which f i e > 0, always breaking ties to ensure that (1) and (2) hold. By the jth consecutive cut of commodity i with respect to f , we mean the first j vertices according to the ordering πi. 4 The next lemma allows us to compute the amount of Nash flow (for a single commodity) escaping any given consecutive cut. To state the lemma, we need a bit of additional notation: for a set of vertices S in a directed graph, let δ + (S) denote the set of edges with tail inside S and head outside S, and δ − (S) the set of edges with head inside S and tail outside S. It is not at all clear how to employ consecutive cuts to prove lower bounds on the cost of the optimal flow, as consecutive cuts do not partition a graph's edge set in any immediately useful way (e.g., different edges cross differing numbers of consecutive cuts, and consecutive cuts of different commodities can intersect in a complicated manner). The next lemma expresses edge latency in terms of "distance labels" on the vertices, and will permit a decomposition of the cost of a flow into the costs incurred across consecutive cuts. 4 Strictly speaking, this is not a valid definition since different choices for the ordering πi give rise to different consecutive cuts. Nevertheless, since our results hold with an arbitrary choice of πi, we will speak of the jth consecutive cut of commodity i w.r.t. f with the understanding that some fixed but arbitrary ordering πi is being used. Next, we connect the telescoping sums of distances with respect to a Nash flow f (as in Lemma 3.6) with the latencies of flow paths (and hence with the cost) of f . 
Proof. To prove part (a), simply note that d 
With all of the preliminaries now in place, we state and prove the main result of this section: the anarchy value of a standard class L of latency functions upper bounds the ratio ρ for any instance with latency functions in L.
Theorem 3.9. Let L be a standard class of latency functions with anarchy value α(L). Let (G, r, ) denote an instance with latency functions drawn from L. Then ρ(G, r, ) ≤ α(L).
Proof. Let G have n vertices and k commodities and admit optimal flowf and acyclic Nash flow f . Invoking Lemma 3.4 and rearranging, we obtain 
The second inequality follows from Lemma 3.6 since [µeλef 
Now, since S
i j is a consecutive cut of commodity i, Lemma 3.5 implies that
We now conclude by applying Lemma 3.8, Lemma 3.5, Lemma 3.7(a), and Lemma 2.3 to obtain
where L i (f ) denotes the common latency of every si-ti flow path of f . The theorem is proved.
MATCHING LOWER BOUNDS IN NET-WORKS OF PARALLEL LINKS
With Theorem 3.9 in hand, it is now a relatively easy matter to prove the main results of the paper. In Subsection 4.1 we prove that, for a standard class of latency functions that contains the constant functions, the worst possible value of ρ (G, r, ) for a multicommodity instance (G, r, ) is realized (up to an arbitrarily small additive factor) by a single-commodity instance on a two-node, two-link network. In Subsection 4.2, we prove that under significantly weaker conditions on the class of allowable latency functions, the worst-case value of ρ(G, r, ) is achieved (again, up to an arbitrarily small factor) by a single-commodity instance on a network with parallel links.
Lower Bounds in Two-Link Networks
We begin by formalizing an argument of the previous section; the following lemma is essentially a restatement of Definitions 3.2 and 3.3.
Lemma 4.1. Let G2 denote the graph with one source vertex, one sink vertex, and two edges directed from source to sink. Let L denote a standard class of latency functions containing the constant functions, with anarchy value α(L). If I2 denotes the set of all instances with underlying network G2 and latency functions in L, then
Combining Theorem 3.9 and Lemma 4.1, we find that the price of anarchy with respect to a class of latency functions containing the constant functions is independent of the class of allowable network topologies. 
Lower Bounds for Arbitrary Classes of Latency Functions
We now relax the assumption that the class of allowable latency functions contains all of the constant functions, and assume instead the following much weaker condition: for any positive real number a, there is a latency function satisfying (0) = a. We call such a class of latency functions diverse. For any class of latency functions that is closed under multiplication by positive scalars 5 , diversity merely asserts that some latency function is positive when evaluated at 0. Under these weaker hypotheses, we have the following. 
Proof. We will assume that α(L) is finite, and will leave the straightforward modifications necessary for the α(L) = +∞ case to the interested reader.
For any > 0, choose a nonzero latency function 1 ∈ L, a positive number r > 0 with 1(r) > 0, and a scalar λ ∈ (0, 1)
Let m be so large thatˆ 2( 
Remark:
The conclusion of the theorem is false with ∪mIm replaced by I2.
COMPUTING THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section, we leverage the results of Sections 3 and 4 to show that computing the price of anarchy with respect to an (almost) arbitrary standard class of latency functions reduces to computing the anarchy value of this class (even when the diversity condition of Theorem 4.4 fails). This provides a general reduction from a combinatorial problem (finding a worst-case instance among all possible multicommodity flow instances) to a simpler analytical one (finding the "nastiest" latency function in a given class). Subsection 5.1 describes this method, and Subsection 5.2 computes the price of anarchy for two important function classes.
A General Method for Computing the Price of Anarchy
In the previous section, we saw that the price of anarchy with respect to a standard and diverse class of latency functions is precisely the anarchy value of the class (Theorem 4.4). In this subsection we will show that this fact remains true under even weaker hypotheses. From a computational perspective, this result has the following interpretation: to compute the price of anarchy with respect to an (almost) arbitrary standard class of latency functions L, it suffices to compute the worst-possible ratio between the cost of a Nash and of an optimal flow in a two-node, two-link network where one link possesses a constant latency function and the other link possesses a latency function of the form β for ∈ L and a positive scalar β > 0 (even though L need not contain β or any constant functions).
The first step of this reduction is the following lemma, which implies that we can always assume that our class of latency functions is closed under multiplication by positive scalars. 
Proof. The left-hand side trivially lower bounds the righthand side since L ⊇ L and hence I ⊇ I. For the reverse inequality, we will show that for any instance (G, r, ) ∈ I and any > 0, there is an instance (G, r, ) ∈ I satisfying ρ(G, r, ) ≥ ρ(G, r, ) − . Fix an instance (G, r, ) ∈ I and > 0, and for an edge e of G write e = βe e for βe > 0 and e ∈ L. The ratio ρ is a continuous function of each scalar βe (holding the network G and the traffic rate vector r fixed), and we may thus replace each βe by a sufficiently close positive rational number γe to obtain a new instance with ρ-value at least ρ(G, r, ) − . Clearing denominators, we may assume that each scalar γe is a positive integer (multiplying all latency functions of an instance by a common positive number does not affect its ρ-value). Finally, replacing each edge e with a directed path of γe edges, each endowed with latency function e, we obtain a network with latency functions in L and with ρ-value at least ρ(G, r, ) − .
The following observation will also be useful. Proof. Simply note that the functions and β (for 0 = ∈ L and β > 0) have equal anarchy value.
Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 yield the following theorem, which reduces computing the price of anarchy (the combinatorial problem of finding a worst-possible multicommodity flow instance) to computing the anarchy value (the simpler analytical problem of determining the worst behavior exhibited by any function in a given class). where I denotes the set of instances with latency functions in L. Applying Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, we obtain the desired equality.
Remarks: The conclusion of Theorem 5.3 fails if the hypothesis that some latency function is positive when evaluated at zero is omitted. We do not know if the assumption that the function class is standard can be omitted. We leave open the problem of computing the price of anarchy for classes of latency functions that fail to satisfy these two hypotheses (though it is not clear if such function classes have any practical import).
Applications
We are finally prepared to put our techniques to use in computing the price of anarchy for some concrete function classes. We give only two illustrative examples; it will be obvious that many other function classes can be treated in a similar way.
Polynomial Latency Functions
For a positive integer p, let Lp denote the set of latency functions that are polynomials with nonnegative coefficients and degree at most p. As a first showcase for our machinery, we next compute the price of anarchy with respect to latency functions Lp.
Proposition 5.4. If Ip is the set of instances with latency functions in
Proof. Since Lp is standard and contains the constant functions, Theorem 4.2 implies that the price of anarchy is simply the anarchy value of Lp. We claim that it suffices to compute the anarchy value of the smaller function class consisting of functions of Lp comprising only one term, namely Lp ≡ {ax i : a ≥ 0, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , p}}. This holds because an instance (G, r, ) with latency functions in Lp can be transformed into an equivalent instance with latency functions in Lp by replacing an edge e of G with latency function e(x) = È p i=0 aix i by a directed path of p + 1 edges, with the ith edge of the path possessing latency function e,i(x) = aix i . Remark: A sharp lower bound on the left-hand side of Proposition 5.4 is provided by the example given at the beginning of Section 3 (the two-node, two-link network with latency functions 1 and x p ); the content of the proposition is that no worse example is possible, even in arbitrary multicommodity flow networks.
Capacitated Latency Functions
The latency function (x) = (u − x) −1 arises as the delay function of an M/M/1 queue with capacity (or service rate) u [6] , and for this reason has been extensively studied in the networking literature [7, 8, 10, 12] . These latency functions do not fit directly into our framework, since they are defined only on the set [0, u), rather than on all of [0, ∞). Nevertheless, only minor generalizations of our results are needed to compute the price of anarchy in this setting.
We will fix two parameters, the largest allowable sum of all traffic rates Rmax and the smallest allowable edge capacity umin. We will assume that Rmax < umin; while it may seem unreasonable to assume that any edge of the network has the capacity to carry all of the demand, our computations below will show that price of anarchy is +∞ if the sum of traffic rates can be arbitrarily close to (or greater than) the smallest edge capacity.
Let L denote the set of latency functions { (x) = (u − x) −1 : u ≥ umin} and, for the purposes of this example only, redefine the anarchy value α( ) of a latency function to be α( ) = sup r : 0<r≤Rmax [λµ + (1 − λ)] −1 , where λ is the unique scalar satisfyingˆ (λr) = (r) and µ = (λr)/ (r).
The key difference between this definition and the original definition of anarchy value (Definition 3.2) is that the range of traffic rates we consider is restricted to lie in (0, Rmax] rather than (0, ∞); this ensures that the equations defining λ and µ make sense. Next, it is straightforward to check that Theorem 3.9 and hence Theorem 5.3 remain valid with our new definition of anarchy value, provided we only care about the worstpossible value of ρ achieved by instances whose sum of all traffic rates is at most Rmax. Since the class L satisfies both hypotheses of Theorem 5.3, computing the price of anarchy with respect to L for instances with sum of all traffic rates at most Rmax reduces to computing the anarchy value of L. 
